And, as always, I expect to cover the main points, but seriously, Friedman takes almost 20 pages on this topic. I'm gonna have to leave you wanting more ... which is why I hope some of you will read the book, too.
Friedman starts off reminding us that people are talking about "the long war." Surely, tThe United States and the Islamic radicals will be at this all century - or longer! Won't they? But remember from last week that what appears to be a permanent state today might wind up looking like a passing phase 20 years from now. Think of how history saw the world change from 1900 to 1920 to 1940, etc.
Ultimately, al Qaeda fails in its goals. Has already failed, in fact. Sure, there'll continue to be more underwear bombings, but that's hardly a victory. "The United States has succeeded, not so much in winning the war as in preventing the Islamists from winning, and, from a geopolitical perspective, that is good enough." Back in 2001, al Qaeda's goal wasn't just to attack the US; it wanted to demonstrate America's weakness and al Qaeda's strength. That, in turn, would lead to undermining Islamic governments that relied on the US (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, on and on) and make the situation ripe for al Qaeda to come into power - and ultimately re-establish the Islamic empire of earlier centuries.
To understand what happens next, think about the last 20 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically destabilized several regions that had been frozen in place as part of the Cold War. The Soviets' collapse and withdrawal ("like a tide receding"), exposed underlying nations that hadn't been free for a century or more. They had no sense of self-government and, sometimes, no workable economy. At the same time, American interest withdrew since there was no longer any confrontation with the Soviets.
What did these newly freed societies do next? Think about how Yugoslavia exploded once they didn't have the Soviets forcing them to play nice to each other. Likewise, the game shifted for that Islamic region between Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Think of other areas all along the underbelly of the former Soviet Union.
The turmoil of this Jihadist era winds up as "less a coherent movement than a regional spasm, the result of a force field being removed." Divisions within the Islamic world will prevent them from stabilizing their base even if the US were to actually withdraw altogether.
The American Grand Strategy
Friedman speaks to a Grand Strategy. I'd hardly say this is some codified strategy. There's no document like the Constitution that outlines it. Well, not that I've ever heard of! But knowing these five points clears things up dramatically. For example, the US response to 9/11 maybe made little sense on the surface ... but in reality, it was exactly in keeping with this Grand Strategy. You can see this playing out in 2001. Likewise in the Cold War, or America's response to Japan in 1941 ... on and on.
In truth, all nations have some Grand Strategy, it's just that not all of them can actually achieve it. It's not always about war, but it is about the processes that constitute national power.
And the United States? Truth be told, the strategy often does involve war. Its Grand Strategy originated in fear. Think of the struggle to gain freedom. Or setting out in defense in the War of 1812 and suffering defeats and set-backs. "Nations are driven by the fear of losing what they have." Keep that in mind as you read these five points of the Grand Strategy:
- The complete domination of North America by the United States Army
The US probably wouldn't have survived as the 13 colonies on the eastern edge of North America. Expanding westward gained critical agriculture and trade power (think of the North American river system in light of this). Battles and wars were fought in part to defend this.
- The elimination of any threat to the United States by any power in the Western Hemisphere
South America isn't really a threat. The connection up through Panama isn't adequate for a real invasion, and South America is broken in half anyway. The main threats come from Mexico and the Caribbean. The Monroe Doctrine addresses this. There's a strategic imperative on preventing European powers from gaining footholds. And, if you may recall, the main time the US really worries about Latin America is when foreign powers have based there. Think Cuban Missile Crisis, for example.
- Complete control of the maritime approaches to the United States by the navy in order to preclude any possibility of invasion
"In 1812 the British navy sailed up the Chesapeake and burned Washington. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was terrified that the British, using their overwhelming control of the North Atlantic, would shut off its access to the ocean, strangling the United States." Again, multiple battles and wars were fought in the 19th century to address this. On the Pacific side, acquiring Alaska and Hawii saw to securing those sea lanes much more peacefully. The US finally secured the Atlantic during World War II. But the end of WWII, the US had such a huge navy that no power was able to operate in the Atlantic without US approval. The US was finally invulnerable to invasion.
- Complete domination of the world's oceans to further secure US physical safety and guarantee control over the international trading system
The US emerged from WWII with naval bases scattered all over the world ... as well as the world's largest navy. Think of how this changed things from the previous century. No other power has ever been able to do this. And, geopolitically speaking, this is the single most important fact in the world: The US controls the world's oceans and therefore the trade routes.
- The prevention of any other nation from challenging US global naval power
We see a carrot and a stick approach here. The US wants to continue holding control of the oceans. Remember, nations never want to lose what they have. The most direct route is to make sure no one else can build a substantial navy. The "carrot" side of things is making sure people don't need big navies. The US makes sure everyone has access to the seas. The "stick" is to wear out enemies in land confrontations so they have few resources left over for navy building.
The US has to engage in regular and unpredictable interventions throughout that region. In the post-Soviet world of the early '90s, the US invaded Kuwait. Then followed Yugoslavia and Afghanistan ... all to prevent hegemons from forming in those regions. Rather than being about oil (a popular notion) or about expanding democracy (my own feeling) ... these things were driven more by the Grand Strategy. And, alarming as they were, they were nothing compared to the investment of resources and blood that went into World War II.
Now we get to a paradox: The ultimate goal of all these interventions isn't to achieve something but to prevent something. Ultimately, this will play out regardless of who's in power in the US. Any US President will wind up following this Grand Strategy because it in the national DNA. From Vietnam to Korea to Kosovo to the present, US policy throughout the 21st century may seem irrational, but since the primary goal will often be just to block or destabilize groups like al Qaeda, they'll be quite rational.
What next?
"The international system is now badly out of balance." The US is the single super-power. But the "natural tendency of the international system is to move to equilibrium." In such an unbalanced world, "smaller powers are at risk from larger, unchecked powers." The logically form coalitions so they can match strength. But coalitions tend to fall apart, and the US can be an "unforgiving giant."
So, we see this contradiction: "On the one hand, the United States is deeply resented and feared; on the other hand, individual nations still try to find a way to get along with the United States. ... This will be a dangerous century, especially for the rest of the world."
My own take on this now
There's a lot not to love about these impersonal geopolitical forces, but let's not fool ourselves and pretend they don't exist. I completely agree that the Jihadists can't win in the end, but I've also noticed a common mistake many folks make these days when they underestimate the power of religious fervor to inflame and unite. A lot of geopolitics assumes that nations will behave in their own best interests - politically, economically - but don't overlook religious interests which can be taken quite seriously by some folks. America saw a demonstration of this in Iraq when the Iraqis behaved ... oddly ... as part of being liberated. Lessons were learned and tactics were adjusted.
Still, looking forward I'll have to agree that the Jihadists eventually must fade from the world stage and become a memory. The intrinsic forces don't exist to keep them going for decade upon decade. Will they fade in the next several years? Maybe not ... but soon enough.
Watch the news then for this common theme: America will play out its fifth strategy over and over by muddling up alliances and preventing hegemons. Other nations will fear, scorn, and even hate the US. Internal US politics will make much ado over this response ... but it's inevitable and the main debate will have to be how to navigate it with integrity.
Up next: Chapter 3 - Population, Computers, and Culture Wars.
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